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The collapse of the Soviet economy and the Soviet Union itself had profound 
consequences for the Soviet defense industry and, in particular, Soviet arms exports. 
Political and fiscal crisis not only gutted the military procurement that kept arms factories 
working, but also destroyed the mechanisms that kept Soviet arms flowing to clients abroad. 
Over the last five years, however, the Russian aims trade has slowly recovered from the 
first dark days after the fall of communism. The process by which the Russian arms industry 
has reasserted itself on world markets reflects in microcosm the development of the new 
Russian state, society, and economy. A vast military-industrial machine serving the state's 
ideological and foreign policy goals has been replaced by a form of state, patronage 
capitalism. Those very few who parlay fortune and political connections into a share of the 
arms export pie can benefit greatly from near-monopolies on exports of arms to newly-
opened world markets. Taking advantage of cheap labor and raw materials, 
Rosvooritzhenie, the Russian state arms export company, has formed an alliance with 
factory directors to return Russia to the world arms market with immense profits as the aim. 
The post-Soviet arms industry is fundamentally a product of the Soviet Union's 
collapse and its ramifications. Not only did the fall of communism devastate Soviet industry 
in general, but the end of the Cold War, which reduced tensions generally, not just along 
the NATO-Warsaw Pact front line in Central Europe, produced a dramatic and continuing 
decline in global demand for arms. Despite chronic political instability in the Middle East 
and increased interest in modem weaponry among the newty-industriafizing states of 
Southeast Asia, the world arms market both as a whole and regionally is substantially 
smaller than it was five years ago, bottoming out at half its previous peak. To make matters 
worse for arms producers, the end of the Cold War not only reduced the demand for arms 
but increased supply by releasing a vast stock of surplus equipment from down-sizing 
militaries, thus flooding world markets. Arms reduction treaties and a rush by financially-
strapped governments to cut defense spending have released second-hand weaponry. 
During this period, all industrial states faced the same dilemma of how to handle an 
excessively large defense-industrial complex, but Russia was hit much harder for a variety 
of reasons. Arms purchases are not just a one-time transaction, but involve both concrete 
continuing commitments to scrvice complex systems and supply spare parts as well as more 
nebulous links of patronage and protection. The disintegration of the USSR threw both 
terms of the equation into question. Russia's ability to reliably service its weapons seemed 
doubtful, and in 1991-1992 Russia's currency as a Great Power patron was devalued. 
Furthermore, not only was Russia's domestic economy more dominated by its military sec-
tor than any other power, but defense spending fell more quickly in Russia than elsewhere. 
Russia's defense plants were often the only employers in particular regions. While in the 
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relatively flexible labor market of the United States, with its moderate unemployment, 
defense workers might reasonably find other jobs, this was not the case in the Soviet Union. 
The poor state of today's Russian military — material, moral, and especially finan-
cial — is beyond doubt and does not require much comment. As examples of just how 
resource-poor the military is, the 1994 budget, a sharp drop from earlier years, provided for 
the purchase of 17 aircraft, and covered seven percent of the shipbuilding program. Matters 
have yet to improve: in 1995, Deputy Defense Minister Kokoshin told the Russian govern-
ment that the military had received only 35 percent of what it needed to support research, 
development and new purchases. In that same year, the Defense Ministry did not purchase 
a single helicopter. Even in 1996, output across the military-industrial complex was still 
down 30 percent from the year before; the Russian navy informed the Red Sormovo plant 
in Nizhnii Novgorod that three Kilo subs it had ordered should instead be sold abroad since 
it would not be able to purchase them itself. Two went to China — the third would go to 
Africa or Southeast Asia. By 1996 a key point had been reached: the Russian arms industry 
now exported more than it produced for domestic use. The Russian military had no plans 
to purchase any new armored personnel carriers or Smerch multiple-rocket systems in 1996. 
Even before that, the premium the industry received from hard currency purchases meant 
that exports had caught up with domestic purchases as a revenue source by 1995.' 
This trend does not mean that exports necessarily grew, only that domestic 
procurement had plummeted. The collapse in domestic military production was only slightly 
worse than that in military exports. In 1992, the U.S. exported 1,241 tanks; Russia exported 
seven.2 As can be seen, the decline in Russian exports was precipitous and far more rapid 
than the overall world declinc in arms exports. Whether measured by figures produced by 
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) or Rosvooruzhenie's own 
figures, arms shipments fell from 1987, the last year of decent exports before collapsc, to 
less lhan a tenth of their previous level by 1994. To be sure, much of the drop-off came 
from sales on grants and credit, not cash transactions. Arms export policy under the Soviet 
Union placed less importance on profits than on foreign policy imperatives. As a result, 
much of the USSR's arms trade lost money by sending weaponry to states with no intention 
of paying for it; still, while the state budget possibly suffered from subsidizing arms for 
allies, individual defense plants and their workers only saw continued employment through 
the production of arms, whatever their destination. That was no longer the case by 1994. 
Arms exports (billions of dolIars): [3 
SIPRI Rosvooruzh enie 
World Russia 
22 
40.034 14.658 
38.133 14.310 
29.972 9.724 
24.470 4.448 
18.405 2.329 
2.504 
22.8* 1.71 
22.8* 2.7, later 3.05 
3.5 (est.) 
World Russia 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
37.616* 14.529* 
30.891 10.459 
25.257 3.838 
24.776 3.385 
24.494 3.388 
21.725 0.842 
3.9 
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In addition to the global factors restricting arms exports, the new Russian arms 
industry lost many of the Soviet Union's traditional markets. Central and Eastern European 
states in particular, aiming to distance themselves from Russia and align themselves with 
NATO, turned away from their traditional Russian suppliers. As late as 1994, Valerii 
Tretiak, Deputy Director of Rosvooruzhenie, still believed that the key market for Russian 
arms exports would prove to be Central and Eastern Europe. This rather astounding 
blindness to both the political realities of arms sales and the sentiment in the regionto 
reduce dependency on Russia as rapidly as possible meant that Central and Eastern Europe 
would prove a disaster for Russian exports, despite military establishments accustomed to 
employing Soviet arms.4 
Those formerly captive markets, seeing arms as a tool of political domination, 
proved a fertile ground for Western manufacturers. Hungary, for example, prepared to 
replace its aging MiG-21 fighters with 30 modern ones at a projected total cost of $1 
billion. American, French, and Swedish firms vied for the contract, while the Israelis 
suggested a upgrade of the older fighters at a substantial savings. The Russians sought to 
compete for the contract with their own MiG-29s and Su-27s. To the Russians, Hungarian 
consideration of Western fighters was part of a more general pattern. The Czech 
government was interested in American F/A-18 and F-16 fighters instead of substantially 
cheaper MiG-21s; the Romanian military had received four S-130B cargo planes and 
upgraded its MiG-21s with Israeli electronics; and the Poles were considering Franco-
German jet trainers. The only possible conclusion was that the Central and Eastern 
European market was lost, since the former Warsaw Pact states only accepted Russian 
aircraft in debt swaps.5 
Russian attempts to reestablish old patron-client relationships could even backfire 
to undercut exports. In June 1995, Russia offered to grant Bulgaria $500 million of military 
equipment, including 100 T-72 tanks, 100BMP-1 armored personnel carriers, and 12 Mi-24 
helicopters. On a subsequent visit to Moscow to promote trade and investment, Bulgarian 
vice-premier Rumen Gechev requested, among other things, assistance in developing the 
Bulgarian arms industry, not grants of Russian weapons made by Russian workers. What 
Gechev received was an offer to exchange Russian military equipment for Bulgarian bonds 
backed by privatized property — reportedly Black Sea resorts. Even the original grant went 
sour. When 100 T-72s arrived in Bulgaria in February 1996, the 12 Mi-24s were rejected 
on grounds of poor technical quality and high cost of upkeep.6 
To add insult to injury, Russia not only lost most of the Central and Eastern 
European market, but now faced competition from its erstwhile fraternal socialist countries. 
These states share the same competitive advantages that Russia enjoys: a generally high 
level of technology and a cost advantage over Western manufacturers from low-priced 
labor. Even the states of the CIS, despite economic situations generally worse than Russia's, 
compete with Russia for the shrinking world arms market thanks to the factories and surplus 
arms bequeathed to them by the disintegration of the USSR. The one advantage Russia has 
is often that of a complete production cycle within its borders. Ukraine, for example, with 
approximately one-third of the USSR's defense enterprises (including 205 production 
facilities and 139 research and design institutes, particularly in radio and electronic 
equipment), suffered a great deal from its dependence on Russian enterprises for key 
components. By 1996, however, Ukraine began to recover. Sales grew from approximately 
$30 million dollars in 1993 to $42 million in 1994, S74 million in 1995, and approximately 
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$100 million in 1996, primarily in avionics and electronics. Ukrainian tanks, produced at 
a center in Kharkiv, proved popular on the world market: in the summer of 1996 Ukraine 
agreed to sell 300 T-80 tanks to Pakistan for S550-S650 million dollars, and also had a T-84 
(diesel) variant of the T-80 on the market. Ukraine even followed Russia's lead in setting 
up a state company to monopolize arms sales. Volodymyr Karkanytsya announced in 
November 1996 that Ukrspetseksport would now unite all of Ukraine's arms exports in 
hopes of increasing state control and promoting sales abroad. The chief question for the 
Ukrainian arms industry was whether it could escape dependence on Russian-made 
components. Russian sources insisted that the T-80 tanks sold to Pakistan were entirely 
reliant on Russian parts. Given Russia's important strategic relationship with India, it was 
unclear whether Ukraine would be able to circumvent that difficulty.7 
In Belarus, a rapidly-deteriorating economy adds the competitive advantage of 
desperation. That is, the government of Belarus is so hungry for hard currency that it is 
quite willing to sell military equipment inherited from the Soviet Union at fire-sale prices. 
In April 1996 the Belarusian government sold Hungary 100 T-72 tanks scheduled for 
elimination under the Conventional Forces in Europe agreement to replace Hungarian T-55 
tanks destroyed under CFE, all for a fraction of what new tanks would cost. Chinese 
premier Li Peng also visited Belarus in June 1995 to discuss military-technical cooperation, 
likely bearing in mind the possibility of high technology at low prices.8 
Even unified Germany proved to be an exporter of Soviet arms. While the now-
combined Bundeswehr kept many Soviet weapons, most notably the MiG-29 fighter, it sold 
BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles to Sweden for only $20,000 apiece. While the Swedish 
military had determined that the BMPs were useless on the modern battlefield, they could 
serve to replace trucks in situations where the BMP's armor protection would be useful.9 
As a result, Russian arms exports hit bottom in the early 1990s, dropping from a 
plateau of $22 billion in 1987 to only $1.7 billion in 1994. Conversion of defense plants to 
civilian production did not offer a practicable solution — history suggests that the most cost-
effective way of converting an economy from military production to civilian is to simply 
let defense plants go bankrupt. Conversion is so expensive that the resources involved, with 
limited exceptions, can more efficiently be spent investing in entirely new production or 
retraining workers. Politically, however, tlirowing defense workers out of work in the name 
of efficiency appeared unacceptable to the Russian government. Moreover, what might be 
economically efficient at the abstract level was a horrifying prospect to managers of defense 
factories and to workers who saw few other prospects. Instead, in 1993 the Russian 
government turned to reinvigorating its arms exports as a source of foreign exchange, with 
the active cooperation of defense plant managers -- a solution shaped by the struggle for 
money and power at the highest levels. 
With markets closing, production falling, and workers unpaid, at the end of 1993 
President Boris Yeltsin created a state monopoly, Rosvooriizhem'e, to take over the 
marketing, financing, sale, and delivery of Russian military equipment and thereby 
reimpose order on the Russian arms industry's chaos. Confronted with conflicting 
jurisdictions over arms sales abroad, on November 18, 1993, Yeltsin gave the new state 
company exclusive control over the export of arms in a secrct ukaz. Under its first director 
Viktor I. Samoilov, this company took over dnd joined together the activities of three 
previously existing organizations: Oboroneksport, handling defense equipment sales and 
support; the Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties' section for production licensing and 
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delivery; and Spetsvneshtekhnika, managing foreign technical assistance programs. By 
eliminating internecine competition, Rosvooruzhenie would at least in theory be able to link 
arms factories with foreign purchasers while establishing delivery plans, financing, and 
service and training contracts.10 
Yeltsin's order had several subtle but crucial winkles providing clues into the 
political struggles surrounding arms exports. First, Yeltsin in effect cut off the Russian 
military, the Defense Ministry, and Defense Minister Pavel Grachev from the arms trade 
by placing Rosvooruzhenie under the oversight of the president's Security Service and his 
own chief bodyguard Aleksandr Korzhakov. Korzhakov, Yeltsin's confidant and the power 
behind the throne in the Kremlin, thus had ultimate authority over Russian arms exports 
and, more importantly, over the billions of dollars in revenue those exports would generate. 
Next, the governmental measure implementing Yeltsin's ukaz was signed not by Prime 
Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, but by Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets, the 
Kremlin's "grey cardinal," linking him closely to arms exports. Finally, one of Samoilov's 
priorities in the new Rosvooruzhenie was the removal of military reserve officers, a theme 
that would recur over the next several years. In short, Yeltsin's order tightly and 
inextricably linked money and power, while cutting off Pavel Grachev and the Defense 
Ministry from any authority over the arms trade — a highly unstable combination." 
This peculiar setup accordingly downplayed considerations of foreign policy and 
Russian national security in the export of arms, emphasizing instead the pure search for 
profit. Of course, all governments seek to involve themselves in arms exports and to 
promote Ihem as a tool of prestige and influence. The Russian system, however, ensures 
that national security and foreign policy will have very little influence on arms sales, which 
are instead pursued simply for the sake of the revenue they can generate for defense plants 
and Rosvooruzhenie. Without understanding that profit overrides national interest or 
rational policymaking, it is difficult to explain both the particular political disputes that 
have grown up around Rosvooruzhenie in its short history and its regular sales of advanced 
military technology to possible rivals. Of course, to hold power and influence in Russia 
today is to be accused of corruption and abuse of office. Those accusations, in the case of 
Rosvooruzhenie, seem to be justified. 
Some criticism of Rosvooruzhenie and its predecessor-organizations in the mass 
media has been rather naive, especially (hat directed against the cheap sale of Russian arms 
on the world market. In 1993 Turkey purchased 110 Russian armored personnel carriers at 
$150,000 apiece, $35,000 less than the American equivalent or other alternatives, leading 
one military correspondent to rage against that "unjustifiable" price. Two journalists were 
scandalized at the sale of a Foxtrot diesel submarine to Australia for use as a museum 
exhibit for only $200,000. In another case, a journalist discovered a sale of two Kilo diesel 
submarines to China for only $90 million each, less than half the price of comparable 
German submarines, and a betrayal of Russia's interests. While their concern is perhaps 
understandable, Russia's most prominent advantage on the worid arms market is precisely 
its ability to undercut the production of other sta(es, thanks to rock-bottom labor costs. The 
relatively poor performance of Russian weaponry during the Gulf War and the war in 
Chechnya is likely of less importance to the buyer than quite justified concerns about 
continuing availability of service and spares. Russia thus has little choice but to offer its 
production at a significant discount.12 
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Rosvooruzheme has been dogged, however, by more genuine scandal throughout its 
existence, scandal concerning more whether cash was flowing in the proper manner than 
with any concrete allegations of corruption. Take, for example, the 1994 low point of 
Russian aims exports as measured by both SIPRI and Rosvooruzhenie's own figures. Those 
results were hardly a ringing endorsement of Yeltsin's new arrangement for the arms trade. 
Viktor Samoilov, the first director of Rosvooruzhenie, was sacked over this matter during 
the winter of 1994-95 and replaced by Aleksandr Kotelkin, a former air force officer with 
rumored connections to Soviet military intelligence. Samoilov's dismissal was followed by 
a purge in April 1995, and by the temporary transfer of military officers assigned to 
Rosvooruzhenie back to their home units. An investigation conducted by Marshal Evgenii 
Shaposhnikov, President Yeltsin's personal representative to Rosvooruzhenie, found 
substantial financial irregularities. In addition to unconscionably large fees to foreign 
middlemen in the arms trade, sometimes totalling 20 percent of the value of the order, the 
firm was guilty of skimming off diesel fuel intended for Cuba and selling it on the open 
market, in addition to setting up its own unauthorized commercial strucutures. It transferred 
export orders to individual enterprises without first signing contracts to export the finished 
products, resulting in $5 billion worth of arms being left to rust in the fields around Russian 
arms factories. The Russian Federation's own General Procurator started criminal 
proceedings against Rosvooruzhenie for tax evasion and illegal hard currency operations, 
including concealing the hard currency proceeds of commercial dealings.13 While there 
certainly was corruption in Rosvooruzhenie, Samoilov's chief sin seems to have been 
presiding over declining sales. The lesson that political survival and lucrative salaries 
depend on steadily increasing revenues was not lost on Rosvooruzhenie's staff: Russia's 
arms export authorities cursed themselves with high expectations by constantly stressing 
to their superiors and the mass media that higher sales were just around the comer.14 
Pavel Grachev, then Minister of Defense, took advantage of Rosvooruzhenie's 
difficulties and Samoilov's removal to attempt to seize the foreign arms trade for himself. 
He announced that Defense Ministry control of arms exports was necessary to avoid the 
chaos and confiisionthat had led Ethiopia to switch its lucrative arms contracts to American 
suppliers. He recounted a conversation with the Sheik of (he United Arab Emirates: "Me 
says, 'four billion dollars... do you have room in your airplane? Here, load this four billion 
in your airplane, I trust you, here's a list, you send me the arms on this list.' I say: 'what are 
you talking about? I don't sell, I facilitate the sale.' Then he says, 'listen, send me tanks...' 
and 1 can't. I sit there like a fool." It seems clear that Grachev was trying to recapture the 
income stream of arms sales abroad for the Defense Ministry: the military's own Voentekh, 
created to handle the sale of surplus equipment, had been forbidden on luly 22, 1994, from 
participating in international arms sales.15 The personnel of Rosvooruzhenie itself, and in 
particular Shaposhnikov, were horrified at the prospect of Defense Ministry interference. 
While the Defense Ministry should be consulted on arms sales, they argued, there was no 
call for wholesale annexation. 
Rosvooruzhenie cemented its influence over the plants producing the arms it 
exported by creating a symbiotic relationship with the factory directors who stood most to 
benefit from increased arms exports and hard-currency earnings. Typically hold-overs from 
Soviet days, especially in the largely non-privatized defense sector, factory directors could 
count on a passive workforce and few legal constraints to sustain a healthy standard of 
living even though their factories' output and sales might steadily decline. Even with the 
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high commissions that Rosvooruzhenie could charge for its middleman's services, ranging 
from 3.5 percent to as high as 7-10 percent, factory directors found that well-paying export 
contracts made their interests coincide quite closely with with Rosvooruzhenie's. Both 
found that Russia's billions of dollars in arms exports left ample profits for all concerned.16 
One of the most striking attributes Rosvooruzhenie's management of arms exports 
is the continuing sale of advanced Russian technology to Western states over the objections 
of tlie Russian military, and additionally the sale of advanced weapons technology to China, 
a potential future threat to Russia's sparsely populated Far East. Again, this seems quite 
difficult to reconcile with rational calculations of national or strategic interest, and is much 
more easily explained by placing profit in first place among Rosvooruzhenie's priorities. 
This attribute of the Russian arms trade, in which Rosvooruzhenie and factor)' directors hold 
almost exclusive control over (he entire process, marks a fundamental difference between 
Russia's exports today as compared to those of the Soviet Union. Current trade seems to 
be fundamentally driven by the need to maximize revenue, not by ideological affinity or 
geopolitics as in the Soviet period, nor even by more general considerations of Russia's 
interest. The chief question is where money can most readily be obtained. 
This context helps to explain the sale of the most advanced Russian weapons systems 
to the West. Rosvooruzhenie'% precursors sold T-80 tanks and Tunguska anti-aircraft 
systems to Great Britain at a time when their export was expressly prohibited under Russian 
law. In February 1993 an American firm signed an agreement by which it would be fully 
briefed on the technical characteristics of Russian weapons on the world market for the total 
cost of $20,000. As one agent of Russia's Federal Counter-intelligence Service noted 
acidly, "For similar services the CIA pays its own agents much more."" Equally difficult 
to understand outside the pursuit of profit is the sale of the S-300V anti-aircraft system 
(Russia's equivalent of the Patriot missile) to the United States. The sale of this system to 
Armenia, closely tied to Russia's air defense, is not particularly difficult to understand. 
Even its sale to the Greek community on Cyprus, Russia's "little brother in faith," is not 
excessively puzzling, despite Turkey's strenuous objections. Selling the S-300s to the West 
is, however, quite difficult to fathom. The story of the S-300s sale first broke through a 
Canadian attempt to buy a version of the S-300 from the Belarusian military, continuing a 
pattern in which cash-starved Belarus served as a conduit for advanced Soviet air-defense 
technology to reach the West. The United States had earlier purchased air defense command 
posts (MP-22-E) from Belarus, but Canada could not use the same channel to purchase the 
S-300. When that Canadian deal fell through, the United States simply bought (he system 
directly from Russia for approximately $60 million. Although the export variant was not 
as technologically advanced as the full version for the Russian military, many within the 
Russian armed forces, to say nothing of the mass media, were quite disturbed at the sale of 
this technology to the West, particularly as the purchase was not of a serial run, but of a 
single model clearly intended to be reverse-engineered to find its design principles.18 
A quite similar situation arose with the ZM-80 (Moskil) anti-ship missile. Known 
in the West as the S-N-22 Sunburn, the missile attracted the attention of the Pentagon, 
which wanted to buy 100 missiles for $107 million. Once again, the evidence suggests the 
U.S. military was purchasing the system to mine its technology, study worthy design 
innovations, and develop appropriate counter-measures. The Ministry of Defense Industry 
had no problem with this; the Ministry of Defense did. Rosvooruzhenie kept out of this 
83 
PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRANSITIONS AFTER COMMUNISM 
dispute, and the military objection really did come too late, as the export variant had long 
since been approved for foreign use." 
The sale of advanced military technology to China is also difficult to understand 
except in the context of calculations dominated by the search for profit. U.S. Defense 
Secretary William Perry accused Russia and Ukraine of planning to sell SS-18 missile 
technology to China. Russia denied the charges, while promising to investigate the matter, 
however, it is indisputable that its sales of aviation, submarine, and tank technology to 
modernize China's armed forces are proceeding apace and have the potential to 
substantially alter the regional balance of power. In addition to Russia's delivery of 
numerous Kilo diesel submarines to China, Russia and China also signed a $2.2 billion 
agreement providing for the production of Su-27 fighters under license in China and the 
transfer of T-80 tanks. Chinese premier Li Peng's visit to Moscow at the end of 1996 was 
intended in part to finalize details of the Su-27 sale. Given the more-or-less steady 
improvement in Sino-Russian relations over the last ten years, the possibility of 
endangering Russia's own security by arming China appears to have been considered and 
discounted.20 
The way in which factory directors and Rosvooruzhenie can cooperate to mutual 
advantage was amply demonstrated by the shake-up in Yeltsin's administration after the 
first round of the presidential elections and its implications for the management of arms 
exports. On June 7,1996, the Russian Federation's General Procurator Iurli Skuratov made 
an official complaint to Yeltsin about irregularities in the legal status of military officers 
working in Rosvooruzhenie, and the deleterious effects on military morale of the extremely 
high salaries they were receiving - up to several thousand dollars a month, much higher 
than officers in the armed forces could expect. Nothing was done about the matter until the 
first round of the presidential elections made it clear that Yeltsin would have to get rid of 
the most unpopular members of his circle, including Defense Minister Grachev, Deputy 
Prime Minister Soskovets, and his chief bodyguard Aleksandr Korzhakov. Two days after 
Korzhakov, Rosvooruzhenie's chief patron and protector, was removed, Yeltsin requested 
that the investigation and rcgularization of Rosvooruzhenie go forward. At this point, 
however, the factory directors who had benefitted from the arms sales that Rosvooruzhenie 
had arranged stepped in to defend Kotelkin and the rest of its management. A petition of 
factory directors and chief designers begged Yeltsin to leave things well enough alone; 
instability was the last thing they wanted. On July 7, Yeltsin accordingly backtrackcd, 
"ordering that no changes in Rosvooruzhenie's management take place. The only factory 
directors that seem unhappy with the current state of affairs are those whose plants are not 
benefitting from Russia's growing arms sales.21 Kotelkin seems to have survived the loss 
of Korzhakov without undue difficulty, and his tactical alliance with the managers of arms 
factories seems to have served him well. Some rumors insist that Prime Minister Viktor 
Chernomyrdin has his own candidate in mind for Rosvooruzhenie, but such speculation has 
not yet resulted in any specific personnel changes. 
Despite this constant political instability, Rosvooruzhenie has been able to reestab-
lish Russian exports to its traditional markets, as well as expand to new ones. The cheap 
prices and simplicity of Russian products far outweigh any concerns about their quality and 
effectiveness raised by the poor performance of Russian arms in the Persian Gulf War and 
the war in Chechnya.22 Unable to expand sales in Europe or North America, Rosvooru-
zhenie has largely turned to the more promising customers of the Middle East and Asia.23 
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In a world plagued by the outbreak of peace, the Middle East is perennially fertile 
ground for arms manufacturers. Even with Russia's traditional customers like Libya, Iraq, 
Syria, and Yemen either under international sanctions or simply unable to pay their bills, 
Rosvooruzhenie has made great strides in boosting its arms exports to the region. Syria, in 
particular, but Egypt as well, are also seen as Russian arms consumers. Not only is there a 
historic tradition among many Arab states of buying Soviet arms, but getting military 
equipment from Russia is also a simple way of decreasing dependence on the United States 
and its growing influence in the region. 
The first step to reestablishing sales in the Mideast was resolving the nagging 
question of the immense debts to the Soviet Union left outstanding from the halcyon days 
when arms were bought with credits that never needed to be repaid. Syria alone had built 
up $10 billion of arms debt, but in May 1994 Russia agreed to write down that debt by 80-
90 percent to enable Syria to resume arms purchases, this time for cash. The possibility of 
$500 million in new purchases was more than enough to compensate for giving up the slim 
chance of collecting on old Syrian debt.24 
Russia temporarily gave up one of its most lucrative arms customers, Iran, in 
response to an American carrot-and-stick approach, a fact that might seem to counter the 
overall thesis that Russian arms sales are at present driven solely by the profit motive of 
Rosvooruzhenie and the factory directors with whom it works. In October 1994, Russia 
agreed to sign no new arms contracts with Iran. Russia had already transferred two Kilo 
diesel submarines to Teheran's control, making Iran the first Persian Gulf slate to possess 
submarines. There is great reason to doubt, however, Russia's sincere desire to maintain its 
commitment to no new arms deals with Iran. At the same time as Russia's declaration, Iran 
announced that it would not accept a third Kilo submarine to match the two it had 
purchased earlier. Russian batteries did not hold their charge well in the warm waters of the 
Persian Gulf, so the Kilos proved much less useful than the Iranian military had hoped. 
Given that previously agreed orders as part of a multi-billion dollar contract would go 
forward as scheduled, the practical impact of the Russian decision was minimal. By 
February 1996, a spokesman for Russia's Ministry of Foreign Trade was already happy to 
announce that Iran was ready to purchase $1 billion of arms over the next two years, and 
in January 1997 a third Kilo submarine went to Iran.15 
Most aggravating for U.S. arms producers must have been Russian encroachment 
on the arms procurement of the rich Gulf sheikdoms, not the loss of non-existent business 
with Iran. The wealthy oil states, nervous about the dangers represented by Iran, Iraq, and 
their own restless populations, are buying arms heavily and will likely continue to do so for 
the foreseeable future. Thus it seems relatively surprising that Kuwait and the United Arab 
Emirates, almost entirely dependent on the United States for their military security, turned 
to Russia for arms purchases. In July 1994, Western sources reported that Kuwait was 
planning a major purchase of armored personnel carriers and anti-aircraft systems from 
Russia, and by December Rosvooruzhenie could confirm the sale of 60 BMP-3 infantry 
fighting vehicles to Kuwait and 50 to the U.A.E. at a price of around $800,000 each. At 
Abu Dhabi in March 1995, Kuwait signed a comprehensive purchase agreement for $762 
million. It seems that the Gulf sheikdoms are attempting to ingratiate themselves with as 
many powers as possible, both to counterbalance the influence of the United States and to 
exert some leverage against increased Russian arms sales to Iran and Iraq.24 
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On balance, Russia's aims sales to (he Gulf States will not likely prove destabilizing. 
Those states not under international sanctions are also those with the most resources 
available for arms purchases. The revisionist or destabilizing powers of the region — Iraq, 
Iran, and Libya — are unlikely to prove major markets for Russian arms. In general Russia 
appears to be observing international sanctions in the region, and the very fact that Russian 
arms must now be paid for, instead of being given away on easy credit, will keep 
procurements in the region substantially below the level of the 1980s. Even though Russia 
has written off most Syrian debt, it will certainly expect prompt payment for any new 
purchases. The greatest danger to peace and stability in the region from Russian arms sales 
will not come from the Mideast proper; instead, Russian sales to Cyprus and the possibility 
of a Turkish military response seem far more dangerous. 
Despite continuing political instability in the Middle East, Russia's best prospects 
are in Asia. Rapidly growing economies can afford increasingly advanced technology, 
creating a small-scale arms race capable of providing targe defense contracts for 
Rosvooruzhenie. Russia's Asian market is dominated by the region's two poor giants: India 
and China. India had been one of the Soviet Union's traditional arms markets, but Russia 
temporarily lost that customer when the collapse of the Soviet Union crippled India's ability 
to get vital spare parts. India was accordingly forced to look elsewhere. With the creation 
of Rosvooruzhenie and the consolidation of Russian state authority, India could return again 
to its traditional armorer. By November 1994, India was contemplating the purchase of 18-
20 Mig-29Ms, 18-20 Su-30s, and upgrades for its aging MiG-21 "Fishbed" fighters, as well 
as Kilo submarines to replace the older Soviet Foxtrot subs it was decommissioning. 
Despite the perhaps unreliable nature of the stream of supply from Russia, Indian 
authorities were won over by the "cheaper... hardier... and familiar" Russian hardware. In 
January 1995 Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao agreed with Chernomyrdin on a multi-
part deal involving the sale of fighter aircraft, the upgrade of MiG-21s, and the lease of 120 
self-propelled artillery systems that over the next year would come to full fruition. Two 
months later at the weapons exposition in Abu Dhabi, India signed in secret a contract for 
12 Tunguska anti-aircraft systems, and more purchases appeared to be forthcoming.21 
India signed a similar deal for 10 MiG-29s at a price of S200 million, far cheaper 
than any Western alternative, and in July 1995 Rosvooruzhenie's director Aleksandr 
Koltelkin predicted that a contract for jet trainers would soon follow. The last of that batch 
of ten arrived in India in December 1995, and in addition to maintaining its own aircraft 
India would service Malaysia's new MiGs as well. With 80 percent of the Indian Air Force 
made up of MiGs, the relationship was quite strong. Taken together, India's interest in the 
Msta-V self-propelled howitzers and additional Su-27 fighters, a six-year, $7 billion 
military-technical cooperation deal, and the perhaps $3.5 billion dollars worth of contracts 
that Evgenii Primakov signed in India in March 1996, meant that India's disinclination to 
purchase the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov was only a minor difficult)'. In November 
1996 the Indian cabinet approved the purchase of 20 Su-30 aircraft with an option to 
purchase 20 more, and then in January 1997 agreed to purchase two Kilo submarines and 
build another two in India under license. Those were intended to replace six aging 
submarines of Soviet design, and would join eight Kilo submarines India already had in 
service. Clearly, India would remain a key customer for Russian arms.28 
China also proved a valuable customer, substantially ending the chill in relations that 
had lasted since the Sino-Soviet split. Intelligence and diplomatic sources reported in 
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November 1994 that China had bought four Kilos at around S240 million each, and 
American naval overflights kept a close watch on the slow progress of a Kilo sub, lashed 
to the deck of a freighter, as it made its way to China. Opinion in the U.S. Navy held that 
China aimed at purchasing 10 Kilo subs with an option to take that up to 22. By the end of 
1995, the total number of Kilos China had bought totalled eight, most or all from the Red 
Sormovo plant in Nizhnii Novgorod." 
The Chinese military also sought to modernize its air force using Russian aircraft. 
After a long wrangle over the terms of the deal, Russia and China agreed in 1995 to extend 
a 1991 agreement on the sale of Su-27 fighters to China. While delivery would be 
immediate, part of the understanding was that production would eventually be established 
inside China. Sino-Russian cooperation expanded in 1996, as reported by The New York 
Times, to include a $1 billion dollar deal for 72 Su-27 fighters under stunningly good terms 
for the Chinese. Two-thirds of the price tag would be paid off in baiter goods, and China 
would set up production domestically under license.30 
With India and China as Russia's best customers in Asia, the very arms buildup that 
Russia supplied triggered new business for Rosvooruzhenie. Malaysia purchased 20 MiG-
29s in 1994 at a cost of $550 million dollars, paid partly in palm oil, joining a general trend 
towards more modern forces in Southeast Asia. Vietnam bought six Su-27s in 1995 to 
modernize its air fleet, motivated in part by fear of China." 
Although the Mideast and Asia are Russia's markets for the future, Rosvooruzhenie 
has even managed to pry open the Latin American market, especially in Brazil. For a variety 
of reasons, the United States remains unwilling to promote its weapons to the full extent 
possible in Central and South America, creating an opportunity for cheap and effective 
Russian arms to make an entry. In 1994, for example, Brazil bought a consignment of SA-
18 anti-aircraft missiles, and was close to a deal to purchase nearly 300 T-72 tanks at a cost 
of around $1.2 million each. (Brazil previously had NO MBTs.)'2 
Rosvooruzhenie, then, represents in microcosm in both foreign and domestic policy 
the state of the new Russia, and in particular the recovery of a particular kind of state 
authority based on patronage capitalism. Abroad, Rosvooruzhenie has both reasserted 
Russia's presence in some traditional arms markets while showing increasing activity and 
ambition in exploring new ones, regardless of the West's preferences in the matter. At 
home, former communist apparatchiks, whether factory directors, military officers, or 
foreign trade bureaucrats, have embraced whole-heartedly the pursuit of profit and the 
business opportunities offered by Russian weapons, in demand abroad and built at or near 
world standards. Relying on an alliance of nomenklatura capitalists in Moscow and factory 
directors eager for export contracts, Rosvooruzhenie has brought Russia back to world 
markets while making great profits for those in position to take advantage of crony 
capitalism, making it a model in miniature of contemporary Russia, 
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